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Abstract. In this paper we argue that in contemporary society a form
of security emerges that is qualitatively neither technological nor social
but that is truly sociotechnical. We argue that everyday security is a form
of sociotechnical security co-constituted of both technological protection
mechanisms designed to protect assets and of relational social practices
that enable people to build and maintain trust in their daily interactions.
We further argue that the complexity of real-world information security
problems requires security models that are able to articulate and exam-
ine security as a sociotechnical phenomenon and that can articulate and
examine the results of interaction between these two security construc-
tions. Security must be modelled to acknowledge, at least, the connection
between an individual’s security needs and the protection of assets if it
is to help design secure services with which citizens can safely engage.
We exemplify these attributes from case studies conducted as part of
two sociotechnical research projects: the UK government and research
council funded Cyber Security Cartographies (CySeCa) project and the
EU FP7 funded project TREsPASS. These are introduced to discuss the
potential for a family of modelling techniques. In this paper we examine
the attributes of everyday security problems and reflect upon how such
a modelling family might influence both academic research and practice
in contemporary information security.
1 Introduction
The subtleties of secure human-computer interaction are often hard to pin down.
The design of security technologies focuses on the protection of data and the us-
ability requirements for that technology. Rarely does the security technology
design process address the human security needs of the individual where human
security needs fundamentally address a sense of confidence to achieve well-being
e.g. financial well-being and emotional well-being. In security theory, protection
from harms is sometimes termed negative security whilst the freedom to achieve
human security needs such as financial security or well-being is termed positive
security [23, 31]. Whilst security technology design is well-established in terms of
protecting data and by extension, the owners and dependents of that data, from
harm, security technology design is less well-established in enabling the freedom
to use that data in a way that enables individuals to meet their other human
security needs. For example, when a granddaughter helps her grandmother con-
duct important on-line activities [21], e.g., by conducting on-line banking or
interacting with the on-line welfare system on her grandmother’s behalf, the
granddaughter is acting as a so-called social proxy, a position of power that can
be either supportive or abusive. In a supportive situation, the grandmother may
want to have the freedom to share her access with her granddaughter as a means
of enabling financial security through the receipt of care from her granddaughter.
Similarly, when a grandmother gives her granddaughter advice on which friends
to block or whether to respond to a social media post, the grandmother is acting
as a type of gatekeeper that in a supportive situation enables the granddaughter
to maintain her social relationships.
Although such usage scenarios are not uncommon and have obvious conse-
quences for the security of the system and the safety of the actors, it is a very
rare digital service design that takes such scenarios into account and even rarer
that the underpinning system has an underlying security model that can cap-
ture the many subtle aspects of such scenarios. In this scenario the sharing of
passwords, the incorporation of those typically considered to be non-users of a
system is often built around the human security need to build and maintain
trust relationships to engender confidence and a sense of well-being, rather than
the focus on protecting data on a system. For this reason, standard technical
responses of delegated authority and role-based access control do not fully suffice
because these technological responses focus on the data and system protection
needs, with an assumption that these fully correspond to the human security
needs.
In the example outlined above, the technological problem is one of ensuring
managed access, the human problem is one of preventing outsiders from gaining
access and of enablement to meet the fundamental need of a sense of well-being
through the receipt of care and support from family members. The technological
controls respond to the former human security problems but not the latter ones.
The technological support needed for the latter human problem is one of building
and maintaining care relationships and managing the trust relationships needed
to support those care relationships.
The focus of information security practice and academic study has tradition-
ally been squarely aimed at IT security [14]. IT security can be explained as
the protection of computer produced data and information and the associated
protection of the infrastructure that makes possible the production, circulation,
protection and curation of that data. However, the protection of data is not solely
a question of IT security. The widespread adoption of digital technology across
all strata of society and the increasing reliance by governments and industry on
engagement with citizens through digital media brings data protection into the
realm of everyday life for citizens. If data protection is to make sense to citizens
as they go about their everyday lives, IT security must clearly link to human
security needs such as those related to an individual’s financial, health, physical
well-being and stability. This paper asks how might we model data protection in
this everyday realm, how this model might improve understanding of everyday
security practices and how it might help broaden IT security.
2 Security: a divided field of study
The separation that we can see in information security between the human se-
curity needs of the actors and the data security needs of the infrastructure is
common to many studies of security, not only technological ones. As McSweeney
highlights in the introduction to “Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology
of International Relations” [23] security is a term that is used in a wide range
of contexts in all aspects of life and it can refer to people, things, practices, ex-
ternal events and innermost feelings. The study of security is equally broad and
is studied from many different perspectives [26] across many different disciplines
including Politics and International Relations e.g. [27], Geopolitics e.g. [8, 1],
Critical and Social Geography e.g. [11], Psychology e.g. [7, 4], Sociology e.g. [10,
24], Computer Science e.g. [19, 18] and Maths e.g. [3]. These different perspec-
tives of security often influence each other. For example, Security Studies focuses
on the protection of the State and is often located within Politics and Interna-
tional Relations but also crosses over into Geopolitics in order to examine the
security of boarders and of populations e.g. [1]. Regardless of the focus of se-
curity study, there is a tendency to focus on the materiality of security using
epistemologies related to positivist forms of knowledge [23]. Materials of security
range from battlefield technology to surveillance technologies and information
access control systems. Just as traditional international relation security theo-
rists emphasise the use of the military, traditional computer security theorists
emphasise the use of cryptography and access control protocols. In pursuing
this focus on the materiality of security, traditional security studies across all
disciplines tend to focus on the externalising of security problems and ignore
the question of the internalising of security problems within the individual and
the central question of how the individual conceptualises security [23]. However,
the relationship between the externalisation of security problems (how they are
articulated and framed) and how an individual conceptualises security is an im-
portant dimension to secure human-computer interaction.
Studies of security do, however, differ in the families of referent objects that
are the focus of each type of study [23]; a separation often motivated by aca-
demic rather than governmental politics. In the case of information security, the
primary referent object is the computer generated data or information with a
secondary referent object being the computational infrastructure that supports
the generation, storage, circulation and curation of the data, e.g. [22, 3, 15, 32,
2, 19]. When humans are introduced into this picture of information security by
way of sociotechnical security modelling, they are typically subjugated to the
needs of the protection of data and their actions are analysed in terms of their
contribution to or detraction from the protective act. The implicit assumption
in this type of modelling is that the protection of data and the concomitant pro-
tection of the technological infrastructure is a human security need. Examples of
this genre of security modelling include: [29, 9]. Traditional models of informa-
tion security extended to include human action therefore reflect this assumption
that human actions related to the needs of data protection are modelled. How-
ever, human-centered studies of information security consistently demonstrate
that the relationship between data protection and the needs of individuals is
complex [28, 17]. In order to achieve this the perspective of information security
needs to be broadened to include a focus on the connection between human secu-
rity needs and IT security needs and the development of a meaningful connection
between the two.
3 The case for broadening the focus of information
security
Over the last two decades there has been a growing call for the broadening
of security studies in the international arena [23]. Sociologist Bill McSweeney
argued that security in a broader context should be regarded as both protection
from (negative freedoms) and the freedom to (positive freedom) [23]. In terms
of negative freedom there is a freedom from threat and is, as McSweeney argues,
characterised in objects such as locks, doors, walls etc. that protect things and
prevent things from happening. However, there is another form of security, this is
adjectival rather than normative — “secure” rather than “security” — a quality
that conveys the essence of making things possible. This related form is “freedom
to” rather than “freedom from” and should not be seen as an alternative to
the more traditional conceptualisation of security as freedom from threat but
should be seen as an interrelated concept. From this perspective access control
to a particular data file, for example, should not only be seen as a mechanism
for the protection of the data but also as the granting of access to data that
empowers an individual to build and sustain relationships as they go about their
daily activities. In this case the human security need is focused on the relational
use rather than on the material protection of data. If the need for the material
protection of data is to be understood, the protection mechanisms must support,
and be understood to support, the building and maintenance of relationships in
order to capture the co-constituted nature of the negative security protection of
the data (data protection need) and the positive security enablement of a sense of
security derived from trusted human relationships (human security need). This
broader view of information security that more fully captures the relationship
between data and human security needs is highly relevant to the understanding
of secure human-computer interaction.
In the following two sections we examine how information security is tradi-
tionally modelled when the primary referent object is data and how relational
security might be modelled. We start with a description of Bell/LaPadula, Role
Based Access Control and Harrison/Ruzzo/Ullmann modelling and explain the
focus of these classic access control models. We explore the security goals that
can be expressed through such models. We then move to a description of two
rich-picture based modelling attempts to articulate patterns of relational security
within a scenario.
4 Modelling the granddaughters and grandmothers case
using traditional security models
From the granddaughter and grandmother example in the introduction section,
it is clear that the (strategic) security needs of the grandmother and grand-
daughter example is quite different from the kind of security formalised in the
classic access control models such Bell/LaPadula (BLP) [3], Role-Based Access
Control (RBAC) [32], and Harrison/Ruzzo/Ullmann (HRU) [15]. In the follow-
ing sub-sections we explore how such access control models can be applied in
the granddaughter and grandmother example and, in particular, to what ex-
tent they are able to capture and support (and possibly enforce) the grannies’
security goals.
4.1 Bell/LaPadula (BLP)
The Bell/LaPadula access control model, also called the multi-level security
(MLS) model, was originally proposed as a solution to the problem of Trojan
horses stealing information in classified military systems. In the BLP model,
every information source (called an object in the BLP terminology) is assigned a
security level, e.g., secret or top secret (security levels are assumed to be totally
ordered), and every user or user-process of the system (called a subject in the
BLP terminology) is assigned a corresponding clearance level, indicating the
level of information the user is allowed to access. The BLP model then defines
(and enforces) security by preventing users from reading information above their
own level (no read-up) and from writing information below their own level (no
write-down). In other words, a user with a “secret” clearance level can only read
information that is classified as secret or lower and can only write information
at level secret or higher.
In order to apply the BLP model in the context of the granddaughter and
grandmother scenario, we must first identify the relevant objects (information
sources) and subjects (information sinks, e.g., users). In the interest of read-
ability, we shall use the terms “user(s)” and “subject(s)” as well as “informa-
tion (sources)” and “objects” interchangeably. An obvious first choice is to let
grannies and granddaughters be subjects and then define the information pro-
vided by on-line services, e.g., Facebook, to be objects. Even with this simple
modelling, we have captured essential security features/requirements for typi-
cal on-line services: the login process and the privacy/security settings of the
service. In principle, a grandmother could classify information and/or activities
meant to be shared with a granddaughter, such as games provided by the on-line
service, at a low security level and other, more sensitive information as at a high
security level. In this way, the grandmother could make a “low level” login when
sharing the on-line account with a granddaughter, e.g., for playing games or sim-
ply sharing information, and a “high level” login when using the on-line service
for private/personal purposes. Using the framework of the BLP model, the set
of security/clearance levels is subject to very few constraints (technically they
must form a lattice) and can be constructed with arbitrarily high granularity
and thus cover most use cases occurring in practice.
Of course, for the above access control to work, grandmothers would have to
manage on-line identities with several security/clearance levels and, potentially,
several completely different digital identities with different levels of authorisation
and access and, not least, with different login credentials — a daunting task for
even the most tech-savvy granny. One traditional way of solving or at least
alleviating the problem of managing multiple identities, or roles, is to use the
role-based access control model which we will discuss next.
4.2 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
The notion of security that underpins and motivates the RBAC model is the same
as for the BLP model discussed above: essentially preventing users with a given
clearance level from accessing information at a higher security level. However, in
addition, the RBAC model explicitly acknowledges that (1) a user may interact
with the system in several different capacities, e.g., both as an administrator as
well as a “normal” user; (2) some system activities may be performed by any
user in a group of users, e.g., any user belonging to the “auditors” group may
perform certain system audit functions. In the RBAC model this is captured by
introducing roles that can be assigned to users in such a way that a user may
have several roles and a role may be assigned to several users. Roles are typically
defined by the collection of functions (on the system) that a user performing that
role must have access to. This approach has several advantages over “raw” BLP:
it makes administration of access control policies much easier (at least for large
systems with many users and security levels) and more robust since the required
access rights for specific items of information can now be specified “abstractly”
based on what the information should be used for rather than on an individual
basis. This also makes it easier to manage when a users’ access rights should be
expanded/revoked.
For grandmothers wanting to play on-line games or share on-line information
with their granddaughters, the RBAC model offers a cleaner and easier way to
mange security than the BLP model. Instead of managing different identities
and several on-line accounts and their concomitant access control policies, it is
a matter of specifying the different roles a user (grandmother) can perform in
a given on-line service. As an example, a grandmother could specify a “shar-
ing” or “public” role and a “private” role where the latter is obviously used for
interactions the grandmother does not necessarily wish to share with her grand-
daughter, and the former for the kind of shared on-line experience(s) mentioned
above, e.g., playing games or watching video clips together. The notion of roles
can be refined almost endlessly, facilitating a very granular approach to access
control: the grandmother could specify roles to use with each of her grandchil-
dren or specify roles based on age intervals (of her grandchildren or, indeed, any
other family member or friend) ensuring that even the youngest grandchildren
will not accidentally see or access information intended for an older audience.
Although RBAC offers simpler management of access control policies, it is
important to note that the underlying security notions of the RBAC model are
equivalent to those of the BPL: everything that can be (conveniently) specified in
the RBAC model could (much less conveniently) be encoded in the BLP model.
4.3 Harrison/Ruzzo/Ullmann (HRU)
The Harrison/Ruzzo/Ullmann model [15] of access control significantly extends
the previous access control models by allowing access control rights to be changed
dynamically, i.e., during operations, and also makes it possible to delegate au-
thority to other subjects. Unfortunately, the increased expressivity of the HRU
model also makes it much more difficult to reason about the security of a given
system, since it is not generally possible to adequately account for all the dy-
namic behaviour of a system. In fact, determining the security of a given system
in the HRU model has been shown to be undecidable in the general case [15].
With the HRU model a grandmother can, dynamically and temporarily, grant
her granddaughter access rights to information and authority to perform certain
functions on behalf of the grandmother, e.g., in order to play on-line games, all
without letting the granddaughter use grandmother’s login credentials. Another
use of the HRU model would be for a grandmother to delegate authority over
certain aspects of an on-line service to, e.g., a granddaughter. The granddaughter
(with delegated authority) would then be able to both act on behalf of the
grandmother, but also potentially to further delegate authority, e.g., to a carer
or another family member.
Although the HRU model solves (part of) the problem of a grandmother
sharing login credentials with her grandaughter in order to play (on-line) games
and engage in on-line activities, it also introduces a much more complex dynamic
(security) behaviour that is potentially even harder to manage than diefferent
on-line accounts. Even more to the point, the formal access control models dis-
cussed above, i.e., BLP, RBAC, and HRU, all miss the important point that
maybe a grandmother deliberately wants to share her login credentials with her
granddaughter in order to form a stronger bond, i.e., strengthen her relational
security.
5 Modelling the relational security aspects of
granddaughters and grandmothers
The granddaughter and grandmother study was conducted as part of a UK re-
search council funded research project titled Visualisation and Other Methods of
Expression (VOME) that gathered everyday security narratives in the context of
digital services from communities that hitherto had not been part of the digital
service debate. In particular, the project focused on digital service use and the
associated security needs of underserved communities, including: lower socio-
economic groups, long-term unemployed, use of digital services within families
and families separated by prison. The project developed methods of engagement
that were designed to elicit everyday security narratives and develop an articula-
tion of human security needs in the context of digital service use [5]. One of the
project findings was that human security needs were related in large part met
through the management of relationships and the development of new relation-
ships [6, 30]. In two follow-on projects, the UK research council funded research
project titled Cyber Security Cartographies (CySeCa) and the EU FP7 funded
project TREsPASS, methods of visualising and modelling human security needs
were developed. In both projects methods of data elicitation and abstraction
were developed that used techniques to gather narratives of everyday security
and then to abstract relationship networks from the narratives. The approaches
were based on a soft systems modelling technique known as rich picturing [25].
The goal of the CySeCa project was focused on understanding the intersec-
tion between digital data protection mechanisms and relational security prac-
tices. There were two work streams within the project, one that examined re-
lational security practices from the perspective of human social networks and
one that examined data protection mechanisms at the digital network level.
Both work streams developed analytical methods to identify and analyse the
information sharing and protection activities taking place within each type of
network.They also developed visualisations to communicate the security prac-
tices and mechanisms in operation within each network. In this paper, we use
an example of the relational security work from CySeCa to illustrate how the
modelling of relational security might be undertaken. In one case study in the
CySeCa project, the relational security work stream examined the sharing and
protection of information flows within a community centre providing digital ser-
vice support for essential service such as housing, welfare, food, health, education
etc. [20]. The analytical goal of this study was to explore how people feel about
using the centre and the different roles that the centre plays in their lives. In
particular, in this study we wanted to understand how people felt about sharing
information while at the centre — both as part of the process of obtaining the
practical assistance they need in accessing on-line services and also as part of
the socialising and social network building that takes place at the community
centre. In this study we developed visual and written narratives to show how
people experienced information sharing and protection within the community
centre and then used social networking techniques to show the trust bonds be-
tween people in the community centre and the information that flows through
and is protected by those bonds.
This type of approach could be used to produce visual and written narra-
tives as shown in Figure 1 to describe the interaction between grandmother and
granddaughter. In particular, these narratives show the role of the “non-users” or
the social proxy who is helping the service user to carry out a task. For example,
such a narrative might show the granddaughter logging on to on-line banking
Fig. 1. A storyboard of everyday information sharing
on behalf of her grandmother or the grandmother giving advice as to how the
granddaughter might respond to a conflict on Facebook. These narratives could
then be abstracted using social network analysis to show the trust relationships
between grandmother and granddaughter.
Whilst the CySeCa work was successful in depicting the relational security
practices and the relationship of those largely positive security practices to the
human social network, the modelling work did not articulate the interaction be-
tween the relational security practices and the digital security practices which
largely reflect negative security of data protection. The EU FP7 project, TREs-
PASS [33] developed methods and tools to quantify, analyse and visualise so-
ciotechnical information security risks in dynamic organisations.The TREsPASS
project included a work stream to explore the visualisation of sociotechnical in-
formation security risk. The goal of this work stream was to extend the state
of the art in cyber security risk tools by developing visualisations that combine
information visualisations with techniques from critical cartography and digital
humanities to articulate different sociotechnical dimensions of risk and provide
tools through which to explore these dimensions. A form of participatory dia-
gramming and physical modelling [16] was deployed in TREsPASS using physical
modelling tools such as LEGO as shown in Figure 2. The modelling approach
places social data gathered directly from case-study participants at centre-stage
which has the effect of broadening the traditional process of information risk
assessment, accessing social data as a starting point for identifying and then
Fig. 2. LEGO model of a data sharing and protection scenario
scoping the issues that are of paramount interest to the stakeholders in a risk
scenario.
The physical modelling process uses the following steps to brainstorm risk
scenarios: (1) A context or scenario for information sharing and protection is
agreed with a participant group. (2) Participants identify their core values and
the basis on which they share and protect information. (3) Participants are
given physical modelling material, for example LEGO building bricks of given
types and colours, selected so as to encode the movement of shared information
and data, actors, and devices. (4) Participants collaboratively model the chosen
context or scenario in the physical modelling medium and, during this collabo-
rative process, discuss the types of information generation and flows that occur
within this space. (5) Participants identify information sharing and protection
narratives relevant to the context.
Open questions and provocations are used by the modelling session facilita-
tors to encourage participants to focus on a particular sociotechnical information
security risk theme and thereby draw out both the positive and negative security
responses to the scenario. This type of approach could be used to show where
the emphasis of control is in the granddaughter and grandmother scenario and
to enable analysis of where both the human and data security needs might not
be met.
6 Modelling information security’s broader view
The TREsPASS’ physical modelling approach, whilst it combines the positive
and negative security perspectives, is still focused on human security needs as
the referent object rather than data security needs as is the case for the tradi-
tional security models. This difference in referent object focus makes combining
the models a complex task. The challenge that then emerges is how to enable
interaction between the formal data security models and the relational models of
human security needs. In everyday terms this is particularly challenging because
the referent object (the individual) is inherently unstable [23].
Formal security models are typically regarded as incapable of capturing or
modelling the proximity and relational attributes and aspects of human secu-
rity needs. Indeed, much of the terminology and many of the fundamental ideas
and concepts in information security originate from military needs and military
thinking with a strong focus on “asset protection” and automated (or automat-
able) technological protection mechanisms e.g., network firewalls and access con-
trol models [32, 22, 15, 3]. Even though the traditional security models have been
successfully applied in many cases both to design and reason about the security
of a system, there are a number of challenges and pitfalls with this approach.
First of all, there is an implicit assumption that it is possible to identify and de-
fine all the relevant assets and authorised entities in a system. Furthermore, the
security goals (of the authorised entities) must be aligned and non-contradictory.
Finally, although some formal security models allow for dynamic changes in the
model, e.g., dynamic updates of access control lists, typical (formal) security
models assume that the underlying security goals of a system do not change
(too often) and that such changes are handled “out of band”. This traditional
asset-based approach to information security contrasts with a focus on human
security needs where security is a property of relationships and enables a form
of security located in how we build relationships within our kin and friendship
networks. In order to understand this type of security a different type of knowl-
edge is developed from a socially-constructed knowledge paradigm where formal
mathematical models are replaced by patterns of connections forming and re-
forming over time and space.
One approach might be to combine the two types of security goals but as the
granddaughter and grandmother example shows, this requires the modelling of
contradictory goals. Another possibility is to articulate a complex scenario such
as the grandmother and granddaughter case using a family of models where the
data security and relational security models are separate and a third type of
model is introduced which captures the negotiation and navigation between the
two. This third type of model would be a model of everyday negotiation and
serves to shine a light on the important practices undertaken by individuals to
marry data security needs with their human security needs in order to achieve
the most effective co-construction of positive and negative security in a given
context. In the following sections below we introduce the notion of the everyday
into positive and negative security and conclude with a short discussion of the
potential for modelling such everyday security interactions.
7 Introducing the everyday
One of the touch points between the computer security models and the relational
security models is the individual. The individual has to manage the computer
security requirements inscribed into the computer security models with the re-
lational security requirements inscribed in the relational security model. For
example in our scenario the grandmother has to manage the banking require-
ment to use a username and password for her on-line banking account alongside
her practice of sharing technology use with her granddaughter as part of the
grandmother’s approach to managing her fear of losing financial security. This
social practice is based on her trust relationship with her granddaughter. This
is a complicated negotiation between the two types of security models. It re-
quires the grandmother to, amongst other things, judge the trustworthiness of
the granddaughter, be aware of any potential changes in her granddaughter’s be-
haviour and to understand the purpose of the username and password controls
and agree a course of action with her granddaughter. This is an everyday security
problem that requires negotiation between the granddaughter and grandmother.
In recent years there has been a move to develop a scholarship that explores,
theorises and develops an understanding for security in the everyday. The every-
day has become a category of security studies where the focus is “the ‘everyday’
as a category of analysis — with its alternative temporal stress on rhythm and
repetition and scalar emphasis on the micro and proximate” [34]. For example,
we can see in the grandmother and granddaughter example that there are in-
formation sharing routines between the granddaughter and grandmother that
are both frequent, small and happen in close proximity blending on- and off-line
information sharing.
This direction of study is driven by the perspective that the individual is
the ultimate referent object in security studies [23, 31]. The focus of the social
sciences in studying the everyday has largely been developed from a critical
position. Critical theorists argue citizens have not been engaged with in order to
understand their security needs and concerns [34]. In HCI and usable security
studies, the focus has been on describing security practices found in the wild [12,
35] but with little fundamental discussion as to the security goals that these
practices support. In this paper we use the critical theory perspective to augment
our understanding of security practices in the wild wild by taking a closer look
at the interaction between the traditional information security goals related to
the protection of data and human security needs. This augmented understanding
is needed if the grandmother’s and granddaughter’s security practices are to be
understood. In the scenario we have sketched in this paper, both grandmother
and granddaughter need guidance on their security responsibilities to each other
and approaches for ensuring that the trust bonds between them are sufficiently
strong as well as guidance to develop their technical know-how.
8 Security and the everyday
Human security needs are the primary referent object of everyday security as
patterns of practice are, in part, routinised and repeated to develop an indi-
vidual’s ontological security, a form of security founded on basic trust within
relationships [13]. Croft and Vaughan-Williams [34] citing Croft 2012 describe
ontological security as follows: “the key elements of an ontological security frame-
work are a biographical continuity, a cocoon of trust relations, self-integrity and
dread, all of which apply at the level of the individual, and all of which are con-
structed intersubjectively.” In our example we can see that as family members
the granddaughter and grandmother are embodiments of each other’s biograph-
ical continuity, which help to foster strong and deep trust bonds. Each provides
the other with trust relations that insulates or cocoons the other from unwelcome
events using digital services. The self-integrity of both the grandmother’s and
granddaughter’s identity is seemingly intact in the sense that both grandmother
and granddaughter are willing to share different parts of their lives with each
other, fostering a sense of security and safety in the other. Both granddaughter
and grandmother routinise each other’s lives and help to give structure which
helps to manage the dread of insecurity (for example the dread of financial or
social insecurity).
As we can see from the above examples, ontological security therefore man-
ifests itself in the everyday practices that are designed to build and maintain
routines that enable an individual to use trust relationships to cope with com-
plex and uncertain situations. The main focus of ontological security practice is
to routinise life to prevent it from tipping into chaos and to enable individuals
to have the confidence to go about their daily activities. In a digitally-mediated
society, an individual’s everyday security is characterised by combining positive
and negative security techniques in order to maintain an individual’s sense of
ontological security.
In our example of granddaughters and grandmothers the following aspects of
everyday security need to be navigated. The scenario is everyday in the sense that
it is composed of proximate, close, micro relationships between family members.
These close relationships are founded on a repetition of micro interactions. It
is also co-constituted by positive and negative security practices because the
relationship between the granddaughter is in part strengthened by sharing access
to essential on-line services and supporting each other in the use of those services.
The close relationship between granddaughters and grandmothers make possible
the sharing of access and the flow of personal information, equally the sharing
of access and the flow of personal information serve to further strengthen those
bonds meeting the human security need of being confident to engage with the
on-line services and achieve financial security (on-line banking) and relationship
security (mediated through social media).
9 Modeling the everyday
Everyday security can not be reduced to a simple model and to encompass the
different views and the interactions between those views make models too com-
plex to construct and interpret. An alternative approach is to introduce a family
of security models, where computer security models and relational security mod-
els are linked by everyday security models that capture the interaction between
positive and negative security techniques and which show the outcomes of the
negotiation between human security and data security needs.
Models of everyday security need to capture the relationship between pos-
itive and negative security techniques. As our grandmother and granddaugh-
ter example shows, positive and negative aspects of security are concomitant
of each other; the negative protection of username and password protects the
grandmother and granddaughter as service users from attacks from outside the
family and also give each the positive freedom to engage in services that help
each to meet their human security needs of economic stability (on-line banking)
and relational security (social media). Equally granting the other access to their
on-line accounts, either through login credentials or by allowing the viewing of
account activity, provides the positive security of further building trust bonds
through sharing and also the negative security of an additional person to check
the integrity of the on-line transactions. The negative security aspects of this
example can be modelled using standard security modelling techniques such as
BLP and RBAC. The relational aspects of this example can be modelled using
social network analysis. However, neither of these modelling approaches capture
the concomitant nature of positive and negative security and in particular the
different ways in which the individual has to navigate and bring together these
two forms of security to construct an everyday security strategy for a given
situation.
Models of everyday security also need to capture the ontological security po-
sition. Traditional and relational security models also do not explicitly take into
account the ontological security position of both grandmothers and granddaugh-
ters. Furthermore, current modelling techniques do not enable security goals to
be understood from multiple perspectives. In order to understand the security
goals of the granddaughter and grandmother scenario, the security positions of
both the granddaughter and the grandmother has to be taken into account as
well as the perspective of the digital service provider and as well as the perspec-
tives of other family members.
Everyday security models also need to capture the issues arising from emo-
tional, physical and social proximity. These issues include: the negotiation of
proximity and the evaluation of what to share and what to keep private and
an on-going assessment of the motivations of the other in maintaining the trust
relationship.
In summary, a family of models that include the computer security and rela-
tional modelling approaches linked by models of everyday security is one possible
approach to responding to the complexity of everyday security. By introducing
a linked family of models, the security knowledge becomes less fragmented and,
importantly, is brought together without denying the different epistemologies
in which each security knowledge is grounded. In this section we have sketched
some of the requirements for models of everyday security. Such models make
visible the positive security goals arising from fixed-space interaction which is
traditionally invisible to the service security design. Whilst these interactions
are outside of the realm of technological security mechanisms, they have an im-
portant bearing on the meaning and the significance of such mechanisms and
can be used to shape technological security mechanism design.
10 Conclusion
Information security practitioners and scholars have long understood the impor-
tance of context when defining and responding to information security problems.
It is also understood that in real world security multiple perspectives need to be
worked with in order to understand both the problem and the most appropriate
responses. However, as the grandmother and granddaughter scenario shows, in-
formation security is not solely about protection, it is also a story of enablement
and achievement that result in the meeting of an individual’s human security
needs as well as data protection needs. A modelling approach that relates human
security needs with data protection needs and shines a light on the negotiation
process between the two, enables us to connect these two families of security need
and identify how each can support the other. Such a modelling approach also
contributes to the reunification of the field of security, something that is needed
for an effective response to complex real-world everyday security problems.
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